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COMPARING OPEN-ENDED CHOICE EXPERIMENTS
AND EXPERIMENTAL AUCTIONS:A N APPLICATION
TO GOLDEN RICE
JAY R. CORRIGAN,D INAH PURA T. DEPOSITARIO,R ODOLFO M. NAYGA,J R.,
XIMING WU, AND TIFFANY P. LAUDE
We use two experimental valuation methods to estimate consumer demand for genetically modiﬁed
golden rice. The ﬁrst is an open-ended choice experiment (OECE) where participants name the quan-
tities of golden rice and conventional rice demanded at each of several price combinations, one of
which will be randomly chosen as binding. This allows us to estimate market demand by aggregating
demand across participants. This estimate of market demand also allows us to estimate own-price
elasticity and consumer surplus for golden rice. Comparing willingness-to-pay (WTP) estimates from
the OECE with those from a uniform-price auction, we ﬁnd that OECE WTP estimates exhibit less
afﬁliation across rounds, and the effects of positive and negative information under the OECE are
more consistent with prior expectations and existing studies. We also ﬁnd that, while auction WTP
estimates more than double across ﬁve rounds, OECE WTP estimates are stable across rounds and
are always roughly equal to those from the ﬁnal auction round.
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The most common experimental valuation
methods in the agricultural economics liter-
ature today are experimental auctions (e.g.,
Corrigan and Rousu 2006) and nonhypothet-
ical choice experiments (e.g., Alfnes et al.
2006). Researchers have used experimental
auctions to estimate consumer willingness to
pay (WTP) for new products and product
traits for at least twenty-ﬁve years (Hoffman
et al. 1993). Assuming the researcher uses
a demand-revealing auction mechanism like
the Vickrey (1961) or the Becker–DeGroot–
Marschak(BDM)(1964)auction,bidsprovide
a direct measure of auction participants’ WTP
for the good for sale. Taking the difference
between bids submitted for a conventional
good and a good possessing some new quality
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improvement allows the researcher to easily
estimateparticipants’WTPforthisnoveltrait.
Whileinterpretingauctionresultsisstraight-
forward, explaining the auction mechanism to
participants is not necessarily so. In the over-
whelming majority of retail transactions tak-
ing place in the ﬁeld, consumers are presented
with a ﬁxed price at which they can buy one
or more units of the good for sale. This is par-
ticularlytrueinthesupermarketenvironment,
where Americans buy most of their food. By
contrast,experimentalauctionparticipantsare
presented with a ﬁxed quantity and asked to
name the highest price they would be will-
ing to pay. The novelty of the name-your-
reservation-priceexerciseisthencompounded
by the introduction of an unfamiliar auction
mechanism.
On the other hand, participants in choice
experiments (CEs) are presented with two
or more goods and asked to choose the one
they most prefer. Exercises like this are more
similar to familiar retail environments and
therefore should seem straightforward to par-
ticipants. CEs also have a sound theoretical
basis given that they combine Lancaster’s
(1966) characteristics theory of value and
McFadden’s (1974) random utility theory.
Hypothetical CEs have long been used in the
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marketing and environmental valuation liter-
atures. More recently, agricultural economists
have begun using nonhypothetical CEs to
value private goods (e.g., Lusk and Schroeder
2004).MostCEsofferapolychotomouschoice
where participants choose to purchase at most
one unit of one of the goods presented.
A third valuation method that incorporates
many of the advantages of both experimen-
tal auctions and CEs is the nonhypotheti-
cal “open-ended choice experiment” (OECE)
(e.g., Maynard et al. 2004). As with more
conventional CEs, participants in an OECE
are presented with multiple goods for sale
at different prices. And as with experimental
auctions, participants provide open-ended re-
sponses. That is, they can choose to purchase
as many units of the goods for sale as they
wish. Unlike the name-your-reservation-price
exerciseinanexperimentalauction,thename-
your-quantity exercise in an OECE is familiar
to consumers who engage in a similar exercise
every time they purchase food at a supermar-
ket. By soliciting count data instead of binary
data, the OECE allows the researcher to col-
lect a richer data set for a given sample size.
In this study, we use both an experimental
auction and an OECE to estimate the value
that Filipino consumers place on genetically
modiﬁed “golden rice.” In particular, we com-
pare the results of a uniform-price Vickrey
auction with four units supplied with those
from an OECE that can best be thought of
as a reﬁnement of existing OECE method-
ologies.1 We conducted our experiments in
the Philippines, where rice is a staple food
consumed by all Filipinos regardless of age,
income,orothercharacteristics.Thelatestver-
sion of golden rice has been approved for trial
plantings in India and the Philippines (New
Scientist 2005). However, the introduction of
genetically modiﬁed foods has met with mixed
consumer reactions (Lusk et al. 2005). There-
fore,weareinterestedinestimatingAsiancon-
sumers’ WTP for golden rice and how it is
affected by positive and negative information
about genetic modiﬁcation. The data set used
in this study is, to our knowledge, the ﬁrst to
use nonhypothetical empirical valuation tech-
niques to estimate consumer WTP for golden
rice and the ﬁrst of any kind focusing on Asian
consumers’ WTP for golden rice.
The remainder of the article is organized
as follows. The next two sections review the
1 Henceforth, we will refer to the uniform-price auction with
four units supplied simply as a “uniform-price auction.”
literature on golden rice and the effects of in-
formation on experimental auction bids, re-
spectively. We then present a more detailed
discussion of the OECE and how it relates to
the existing auction and CE literature. This is
followed by a description of our experimen-
tal design. We then demonstrate how OECE
data can be used to estimate demand, own-
price elasticity, and consumer surplus. This is
followed by an application to golden rice as
well as a comparison of value estimates from
the OECE and the uniform-price auction.
Golden Rice
The second generation of genetically modi-
ﬁed (GM) crops include those that are bred
for attributes desired by consumers rather
than producers (Rousu et al. 2005). “Golden
rice,” which has been genetically engineered
to contain a higher level of vitamin A, is
a prime example. It is aimed at combating
vitamin A deﬁciency (VAD) in developing
countrieswherericeisthemainstaple(Nielsen
and Anderson 2005). VAD can cause tempo-
rary or permanent vision impairment and in-
creased mortality, especially among children
and pregnant or lactating women.
Scientists at the Philippine-based Interna-
tional Rice Research Institute are currently
working on verifying and improving golden
rice gene constructs and incorporating them
into popular rice varieties. Although golden
rice is still in the development stage, it is
already a source of controversy. Supporters
consider it a solution to VAD, while critics
denounce it as a public relations ploy and con-
siderituselessforthepoor(Zimmermannand
Qaim 2004).
During the last decade, governments and
aid agencies have experimented with various
policies for reducing VAD (e.g., food fortiﬁ-
cation, supplementation, and dietary educa-
tion programs). Because rice is the dominant
staple in Asia, golden rice has several advan-
tages as a vitamin A intervention strategy:
(a) golden rice could be distributed through
existing channels for modern rice varieties;
(b)goldenricecoulddelivervitaminAwithout
the institutional, industrial, and logistical in-
frastructurerequiredforsupplementationand
fortiﬁcation; (c)i fculturally acceptable and
agronomically sound, golden rice has the po-
tential to provide widespread relief; and (d)
most important, golden rice could sustainably
address VAD with minimum additional ex-
pense beyond the sunk costs of developmentCorrigan et al. Open-Ended Choice Experiments and Experimental Auctions 839
and would require only modest additional
investments to achieve greater geographic
coverage (Robertson, Unnevehr, and Dawe
2002).
Zimmermann and Qaim’s (2004) scenario
calculations demonstrate that golden rice will
mitigate blindness and premature death in
the Philippines, with social beneﬁts ranging
between $16 million and $88 million per
year. One unresolved issue, however, is con-
sumer acceptance of golden rice (Robertson,
Unnevehr,andDawe2002).Zimmermannand
Qaim (2004) point out that quality improve-
ments generally increase consumer demand,
butthispresupposesthatconsumersrecognize
and appreciate the quality improvement.
Hossain and Onyango (2004) ﬁnd that con-
sumers’ acceptance of GM foods is driven pri-
marily by their perceptions of risk, beneﬁt,
and safety of the technology. Bredahl (2001)
ﬁnds that consumers do not distinguish be-
tweenrisksandbeneﬁtsofthetechnologyitself
andrisksandbeneﬁtsoftheresultingproducts.
Because consumers generally have little ﬁrst-
handexperiencewithGMfoods,theyareusing
attitudes toward the technology to form opin-
ions about GM food products.
Anderson, Jackson, and Nielsen (2005) use
aglobalcomputablegeneralequilibriumtrade
model to estimate welfare gains from the in-
troduction of golden rice. Assuming golden
rice captures a 45% market share in Asia, the
authors estimate that its introduction would
leadtoa$17.4-billionannualwelfaregain,with
73% of that gain coming from increased pro-
ductivity among unskilled Asian workers.
The only previous empirical valuation study
focusing on golden rice uses the hypothetical
contingentvaluationmethodtoestimateWTP
among a random sample of Mississippi house-
holds (Lusk 2003). Lusk ﬁnds that 62% of sur-
vey respondents given cheap talk information
tocounterhypotheticalbiaswerewillingtopay
a $0.10 per-pound premium for golden rice.
The author estimates that, on average, these
respondents would be willing to pay $0.87 per
pound for golden rice, a $0.12 premium over
the $0.75 reference price for white rice.
Information Effects
Participants in experimental auctions are of-
ten provided with information regarding the
goods for sale. Several experimental auction
studies have evaluated the effect that posi-
tive or negative information can have on par-
ticipants’ WTP for GM food products. For
example,Tegeneetal.(2003)examinedtheef-
fects of positive, negative, and two-sided (con-
ﬂicting) information about biotechnology on
WTP for three different food products. The
authors found that participants who received
only negative information bid on average be-
tween35%and38%lessforGM-labeledfoods
than for foods without the GM label. On the
other hand, participants who received only
positive information bid on average at most
4% less for GM-labeled foods. Participants
who received both positive and negative infor-
mation bid on average between 16% and 29%
lessforGM-labeledfoods,suggestingthatcon-
sumers place greater weight on negative infor-
mation than on positive information. This is
consistent with the ﬁndings of earlier studies,
such as Fox, Hayes, and Shogren (2002), who
foundthatWTPforirradiatedfoodsisaffected
by information in the same way.
Lusk et al. (2004) found that information on
the environmental, health, and social beneﬁts
of genetic modiﬁcation signiﬁcantly decreased
the amount of compensation participants de-
manded in order to consume GM food in four
out of the ﬁve locations where the study was
conducted.
Rousu et al. (2005) examined the effect of
marketing information and labeling on con-
sumers’WTPforcigarettescontainingGMto-
bacco.Theyfoundthat,amongparticipantsnot
provided with marketing information, those
bidding on GM cigarettes explicitly labeled as
such are willing to pay signiﬁcantly less than
those bidding on identical cigarettes with no
GM label. However, among participants who
do receive marketing information, the pres-
enceorabsenceofaGMlabelhasnoimpacton
WTP for the GM cigarettes. This implies that
the positive information reduces the discount
consumers place on genetic modiﬁcation.
More recently, Huffman et al. (2007) stud-
ied how prior information affects the inter-
pretation of new information. They found that
individualswhocameintotheexperimentwith
informed prior beliefs about genetic modiﬁ-
cation discounted GM-labeled food products
more heavily than participants with unin-
formed prior beliefs. The authors note that
the behavior of informed participants suggests
that their prior information was somewhat
negative. When presented in the experiment
with information about biotechnology, unin-
formed participants discounted GM-labeled
products the most heavily when given neg-
ative information. The discount placed on
GM-labeled products was smaller for partici-
pantsgiveneitherpositiveinformationorboth840 August 2009 Amer. J. Agr. Econ.
positive and negative information, although




Hypothetical OECEs have a long history
in the marketing literature. For example,
Gabor, Granger, and Sowter (1970) created
“hypotheticalshopsituations”wheretheypre-
sented participants with product pairs at dif-
ferent prices and asked them to indicate which
product they would purchase and how many
units.Theauthorsuseddatafromareastoresto
show that participants’ behavior in hypotheti-
cal shop situations is broadly similar to that of
consumers in actual markets. More recently,
Pilon (1998) asked participants to choose
among ﬁve beer brands and then among sev-
eral different package sizes and ﬁnally to in-
dicate the desired number of packages. The
author used this hypothetical data to calculate
own-priceandcross-priceelasticityofdemand.
Louviere, Hensher, and Swait’s (2000) text on
stated choice methodology includes a chapter
on analyzing data from “marketing case stud-
ies” like those described above.
Choice experiments and questions elicit-
ing quantity demanded from participants with
different travel costs have also been used
extensively in the environmental valuation lit-
erature (e.g., Herriges and Kling 1999; Ben-
nett and Blamey 2001). Other authors have
adapted contingent valuation methods devel-
oped by environmental economists, applying
themtothevaluationofnewlyintroducedcon-
sumer goods (e.g., Loureiro and Bugbee 2005;
Nayga, Woodward, and Aiew 2006).
Agricultural economists have recently be-
gunestimatingthevalueofprivategoodsusing
nonhypotheticalCEs,complementingthenon-
hypothetical auction experiments long used
in this literature. Lusk and Schroeder (2004)
compare results from hypothetical and nonhy-
pothetical CEs where participants are allowed
tobuyasingleunitofoneofﬁvegradesofbeef-
steak. They ﬁnd that the hypothetical CE sig-
niﬁcantly overstates purchase probability and
thus total WTP. Lusk and Schroeder (2006) go
on to compare results from a nonhypotheti-
cal CE with those from ﬁve demand-revealing
auction experiments and ﬁnd that WTP esti-
mates from the CE are greater than those of
name-your-price auctions. Assuming partici-
pants have unit demand, the authors use CE
data to construct “inverse cumulative density
functions of WTP,” observing that the cumu-
lative density functions “can be interpreted
as demand curves assuming each individual
only consumes one unit and...no other steak
alternative exists to purchase” (p. 15). The
authors also discuss how simulated pairwise
comparisons could be used to calculate elas-
ticity. Alfnes et al. (2006) introduce several in-
teresting reﬁnements of Lusk and Schroeder’s
(2004) technique.
Masters and Sanogo (2002) and Sanogo and
Masters (2002) endowed CE participants with
400 g of a branded infant formula, then of-
fered them the chance to exchange it for in-
creasingly larger quantities of an unbranded
formula, with the understanding that one of
these choice scenarios would be randomly se-
lected as binding. The authors argue that this
iterativeCEiseasiertoexplainandimplement
than a Vickrey auction.
Most similar to the methods we present in
this article, Maynard et al. (2004) develop a
nonhypothetical CE where participants can
purchase any nonnegative quantity of any of
ﬁve types of beefsteak. Participants were pre-
sented with just one set of prices and asked
to allocate a $20 budget across the ﬁve steaks,
with change given in frozen hamburger pat-
ties. The authors argue that CEs where partic-
ipants can indicate any nonnegative quantity
demanded may produce more reliable WTP
estimates than CEs where they can purchase
at most one unit, observing that “diminishing
marginal utility suggests that WTP for the ﬁrst
unit will exceed average WTP per household
purchase occasion” (p. 319).
Our methodology differs from that of May-
nard et al. (2004) in three important ways.
First, participants indicate their quantity de-
mandedatseveralpricecombinationswiththe
understanding that one of these will be ran-
domly determined to be binding. By separat-
ing what participants pay if they buy an item
fromthequantitythattheyindicate,thisdesign
preserves the demand-revealing properties of
widelyusedauctionmechanisms(e.g.,Vickrey,
BDM, random nth price) but in a market en-
vironment more familiar to participants.2 This
design also allows us to estimate an individual
participant’sWTPforasingleunitofthenovel
productasthehighestpriceatwhichhe/shein-
dicates a quantity demanded of at least one.3
2 See the appendix for a formal proof that the OECE is demand
revealing.
3 As discussed below, WTP inferred for an OECE is censored
from above by the highest given price.Corrigan et al. Open-Ended Choice Experiments and Experimental Auctions 841
Aswewilldemonstrateinthelatersection,this
allows us to directly compare results from an
OECE and an experimental auction.
Second, we ﬁx the price of the substitute
productatitspriceoutsideoftheexperimental
marketplace (i.e., its ﬁeld price). Experimen-
talauctionpractitionersincreasinglyrecognize
the role ﬁeld alternatives play in experimen-
tal valuation. For example, Harrison, Harstad,
and Rutstr¨ om (2004) present evidence sug-
gesting that experimental auction participants
take into account ﬁeld alternatives when for-
mulating bids. Researchers can incorporate
ﬁeld substitutes into experimental auctions by
endowing participants with a substitute good
and allowing them to bid to upgrade to the
good possessing the trait of interest. Alterna-
tively, researchers can announce that the ﬁeld
substitute will be for sale at the end of the auc-
tion at its ﬁeld price.
CEsincorporateﬁeldsubstitutesbyoffering
conventional and novel goods side by side. In-
deed,oneofthestrengthsofCEsisthatvarying
thepriceofbothconventionalandnovelgoods
across choice opportunities allows researchers
to estimate cross-price elasticities. One weak-
ness of the OECE proposed here is that be-
causethesubstitutegoodisalwaysavailableat
itsﬁeldprice,researcherscanonlyestimatethe
own-price elasticity for the novel good. How-
ever,theremayalsobeabeneﬁtfromﬁxingthe
price of the substitute good at its ﬁeld price. If
products available outside of the experiment
are offered at prices different from their ﬁeld
prices,thismayhaveunintendedeffectsonde-
mand. For example, consider the case where a
participant is offered the choice between two
goods and a “none of these” option. Even if
purchasing either good would yield positive
surplus, the participant may choose “none of
these” if he/she believes that the good that of-
fers the greatest surplus could be purchased in
the ﬁeld at a lower price. This would have the
effect of understating demand for the favored
good. Removing the “none of these” option
introduces a different problem because it may
forcetheparticipantintoatransactionyielding
negative surplus, thus overstating demand.
In our study, participants were offered an
array of potentially binding prices for 500 g
packages of golden rice (ranging from − − P5 to
− − P25 in− − P2 increments) and were told that 500 g
packagesofconventionalricewouldalwaysbe
available at the − − P15 ﬁeld price.4 Participants
4 Here, − − P represents Philippine pesos. At the time this research
was conducted, $1 = − − P50.
thenindicatedthequantityofeachtypeofrice
they would like to buy for each of the eleven
price combinations, with the understanding
that only one of the price combinations would
be randomly chosen as binding (see ﬁgure 1
forasamplebidform).Byexplicitlyinforming
participants that the conventional alternative
will be available at its ﬁeld price, we eliminate
possibleconfoundinginﬂuencesofsellingﬁeld
goodsatpricesdifferentfromtheirﬁeldprice.5
However, because we do not vary the price of
the ﬁeld substitute, we cannot calculate cross-
price elasticities like Pilon (1998).
Third, in order to mimic an actual shop-
ping environment as closely as possible, we
placednorestrictionsontheamountofmoney
that participants must spend during the exper-
iment. Instead, participants received the fol-
lowing instructions:
Keepinmindthatyouareallowedtoindicate
that you want zero units at any or all of the
price combinations listed. Also keep in mind
that you shouldn’t feel limited by the − − P200
show-up fee that you have earned. You may
choose to spend more than− − P200, but you will
need to provide the additional money your-
self.
Estimating WTP, Consumer Demand,
Own-Price Elasticity, and Consumer Surplus
Because each participant indicates the quan-
tity of the novel good demanded at an array
of prices, the OECE allows the researcher to
estimate individuals’ WTP for a single unit of
the good as the highest price at which they in-
dicate a positive quantity. Censoring will be an
issue for participants who indicate a positive
quantity at the highest price. However, pro-
vided that fewer than half of WTP estimates
are censored, median WTP estimates will not
be affected. Conducting a pretest should allow
theresearchertochooseanOECEpricerange
that minimizes the censoring problem.
Because participants can request any non-
negative quantity at a given price level, the re-
searcher can estimate individual participants’
entire demand curves, not just their WTP for
a single unit. To aggregate consumer demand
5 An alternative approach would be to simply tell participants
the price at which they could purchase the ﬁeld substitute outside
the experiment. However, under this framework the transaction
costs of purchasing the substitutes in the ﬁeld are unknown to the
researcher. If the ﬁeld substitute and the focus good are sold side
by side in an OECE, the researcher can safely assume that the
transaction costs are the same for purchasing either good.842 August 2009 Amer. J. Agr. Econ.
Desired units of 
golden rice 
Desired units of 
conventional rice 
Golden rice price P5;
Conventional price P15
Golden rice price P7;
Conventional price P15
Golden rice price P9;
Conventional price P15
Golden rice price P11;
Conventional price P15
Golden rice price P13;
Conventional price P15
Golden rice price P15;
Conventional price P15
Golden rice price P17;
Conventional price P15
Golden rice price P19;
Conventional price P15
Golden rice price P   ; 1 2
Conventional price P15
Golden rice price P23;
Conventional price P15
Golden rice price P25;
Conventional price P15
Figure 1. Sample bid form
across participants, the researcher sums indi-
vidual demand at each price. A more formal
estimate of the quantity of the novel good de-
manded by each participant as a function of
own price can be estimated using a random ef-
fects Poisson regression (Hausman, Hall, and
Griliches 1984). This speciﬁcation takes into
accountthepanelandcountnatureofthedata
whilealsoallowingfortheoverdispersioncom-
mon in this type of demand study. Start by as-
suming that
Pr(qij = m) = f (m, pj,ui) (1)
where qij is the quantity demanded by partici-
pant i when facing price pj ∈ {p1,...,pJ}, m is
a nonnegative integer, and ui is an individual-
speciﬁc effect. Assuming qij is drawn from a
Poisson distribution:





where  ij = exp( 0 +  1pj + ui). Recognizing
that the individual-speciﬁc effects are not cor-
related with the exogenously set price pj, the





Assuming that Ui = exp(ui)i sdrawn from
a normalized gamma distribution with mean 1
and variance  , the unconditional joint prob-
ability is found by integrating (3) with respect
to Ui.T he resulting function is a negative bi-
nomial model where E(qij) =  ij and V(qij) =
 ij(1 +   ij). The variance–mean ratio for this
model is 1 +   ij, allowing for overdispersion.
Indeed, testing whether   is signiﬁcantly dif-
ferent from zero is a test for overdispersion.6
Under this demand speciﬁcation own-price
elasticity is estimated as





= ˆ  1pj. (4)
One of the beneﬁts of the random effects Pois-
son demand speciﬁcation is that it allows for
theown-priceelasticitytovaryasafunctionof
price.
Compensating variation measures the re-
ductioninincomenecessarytoholdutilitycon-
stantafterapricedecrease.Giventhatpriorto
the introduction of a new product, that prod-
uct cannot be obtained at any price, its intro-
duction can be thought of as a reduction in its
price from inﬁnity to some ﬁnite value. This in
mind, compensating variation is the theoret-
ically correct measure of welfare change fol-
lowing the introduction of a new product or
trait and can be represented as the area under
the new product’s Hicksian demand curve and
above its new price. Unfortunately, Hicksian
demand is unobservable. Much easier to esti-
mateisconsumersurplusortheareaunderthe
Marshallian demand curve and above the new
product’s price.
Under a random effects Poisson demand
speciﬁcation, the researcher estimates con-
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6 Foramore detailed discussion of the random effects Poisson
model, see Cameron and Trivedi (1998).
Conﬁdence intervals around this CS esti-
mate can be derived using a parametric boot-
strappingtechnique(KrinskyandRobb1986).
Experimental Design
We usea2× 4 factorial experimental design
withtwovaluationmechanisms(uniform-price
auctionandOECE)andfourtypesofinforma-
tion about GM products: no information and
positive, negative, and two-sided information.
Hence, we have eight groups of subjects. All
experimental sessions were conducted from
late November to mid-December 2006, with
each of the uniform-price auction treatments
consisting of twenty-ﬁve participants and the
OECE treatments consisting of ﬁfteen par-
ticipants. Uniform-price auction participants
received a− − P100 participation fee. OECE par-
ticipants received a− − P200 participation fee be-
cause that experiment was roughly twice as
long. All subjects were students at the Univer-
sity of the Philippines Los Ba˜ nos.
The uniform-price auction had ﬁve steps:
Step 1:O narrival at the lab site, partic-
ipants were given an ID number and
a packet containing a payment coupon,
consent form, experimental instructions,
questionnaire,and(whenappropriate)in-
formationsheets.Theywereaskedtoread
and sign the consent form and payment
coupon, read together with the monitor
the brief instructions for the experiment,
and complete a questionnaire about their
demographic characteristics and level of
awarenessaboutgeneticmodiﬁcationand
GM food products.
Step 2: Participants engaged in a series of
practice rounds to familiarize themselves
with the auction mechanism. Participants
were shown a chocolate bar and then
asked to submit a sealed bid for it with
the understanding that if this round were
chosen as binding, the four highest bid-
derswouldbuythechocolatebarataprice
equal to the ﬁfth-highest bid. At the end
of the round, the monitor posted the ﬁve
highest bids along with the four highest
bidders’ ID numbers. This same proce-
dure was repeated four more times, and
a binding round was randomly selected
after the ﬁfth round. The actual uniform-
price auction followed.
Step 3: Participants were told that conven-
tional rice could be purchased at a lo-
cal store for about − − P15 per 500 g. They844 August 2009 Amer. J. Agr. Econ.
were also shown a sample bag (500 g)
of the golden rice.7 They were told that
the golden rice was genetically modiﬁed
to produce provitamin A and that other
than its golden color, the bag of rice had
thesamesize,weight,andtasteasconven-
tional rice.
Step 4: After reading the information sheets
(when appropriate), participants submit-
ted a sealed bid for the golden rice. At the
end of the round, the monitor posted the
ﬁve highest bids along with the four high-
estbidders’IDnumbers.Thissameproce-
dure was repeated four more times, and a
binding round was randomly selected af-
ter the ﬁfth round.
Step 5:W inners were given a claim certiﬁ-
cate for 500 g of golden rice and− − P100 less
the cost of rice purchased and were in-
structed to pick up their golden rice on
a future date announced by the monitor
(after all the experiments had been con-
ducted). Participants were asked not to
discuss the study with anyone.
The OECE had ﬁve steps:
Step 1: Same as the uniform-price auction.
Step 2: Participants engaged in a series of
practice rounds to familiarize themselves
with the valuation mechanism. Partici-
pants were shown a large chocolate bar
and a small chocolate bar and were pre-
sented with three possible price combina-
tions for the two candy bars. They were
then asked to indicate how many units
of each candy bar that they would like
to purchase at each price combination.
They were also informed that one of the
price combinations would later be ran-
domly drawn to determine the binding
price combination for the round. All of
the quantities indicated by all partici-
pants under the randomly selected bind-
ing price combination were posted at the
front of the room. This same procedure
7 Participantsinalltreatmentswereactuallyshownconventional
rice colored yellow to look like golden rice. When this experiment
was conducted, golden rice had been approved for test planting in
the Philippines but was not available for consumption. Therefore,
it was impossible to estimate nonhypothetical WTP values with-
out presenting participants with what they thought at the time was
golden rice. Winning participants were asked to return to pick up
any rice that they had agreed to buy after all data had been col-
lected. At that point the monitor explained why golden rice was




ﬁfth round. The actual OECE followed.
Step 3: Same as the uniform-price auction.
Step4:Afterreadingtheinformationsheets,
participants were presented with eleven
possible price combinations. The price of
golden rice ranged from− − P5 to− − P25 in− − P2
increments. Conventional rice was always
available for− − P15, the same price at which
it could be purchased outside of the ex-
periment. For each of the price combina-
tions, participants were asked to indicate
the quantity of each variety of rice (i.e.,
the number of bags) that they wished to
purchase, understanding that one of the
price combinations would later be ran-
domly drawn to determine the binding
price.8 The bindingpricecombinationwas
then determined, and the quantities all
participants indicated for both types of
riceatthatpricecombinationwereposted
at the front of the room. This same proce-
dure was repeated four more times, and a
binding round was randomly selected af-
ter the ﬁfth round.
Step 5: All participants who made purchases
during the experiment were given a claim
certiﬁcate for rice and − − P200 less the to-
tal cost of rice purchased. They were in-
structed to pick up their golden rice on a
futuredateannouncedbythemonitor(af-
ter all of the experiments had been con-
ducted). Participants were asked not to
discuss the study with anyone.9
Empirical Results
Table 1 summarizes socioeconomic character-
istics for the sixty participants who took part
in the OECE and the hundred who took part
in the uniform-price auction. The two sam-
plesdiffersigniﬁcantlyintermsofgender,class
year, frequency of buying rice, age, and house-
hold size.
8 As Shogren, List, and Hayes (2000) ﬁnd and Alfnes (2007)
shows formally, WTP for a novel good in an experimental setting
may be inﬂuenced by “preference learning” where participants
are primarily interested in purchasing the product not for its one-
time consumption value but in order to determine how it can be
incorporated into their preference set. Preference learning may
also impact demand for the ﬁrst unit of a novel good in an OECE,
although whether it would inﬂuence demand for subsequent units
is unclear.
9 All experimental instructions can be found in Corrigan et al.
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Table 1. Participants’ Socioeconomic Characteristics
Uniform-Price Auction OECE
(N = 100) (N = 60)
Variable Categories Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Age 19.0 0.4 19.6 1.9
Household size 5.5 2.3 3.4 2.7
Family incomea 6.55 5.4 6.0 5.5
Gender Male 20% 40%
Female 80% 60%
Year classiﬁcation Freshman/sophomore 0% 7%
Junior/senior 100% 93%
Frequency of buying rice Seldom 65% 40%
At least monthly 35% 60%
Level of awareness Informed 70% 78%
about golden rice Uniformed 30% 22%
Opinion on safety Safe 55% 63%
of golden rice Not safe 45% 37%
aFamily income was reported in seventeen − − P10,000 intervals: (less than 9,999), (10,000–19,999),...,(170,000 and higher).
Estimating Consumer Demand, Own-Price
Elasticity, and Consumer Surplus from the
OECE
When performing this kind of demand analy-
sis, it is important to consider the timeframe
in which we deﬁne demand. This will depend
in large part on the shopping behavior of par-
ticipants. In our study, the participants were
Filipino university students. Like Filipinos in
general, Filipino students tend to buy enough
food supply in a given shopping trip for one
week. We therefore interpret our data as es-
timates of weekly rice demand. For instance,
when the price of golden rice was − − P15, we
foundthattheaverageparticipant’sweeklyde-
mandis1.8kg,equivalenttoanannualdemand
of 94 kg. This is in line with recent estimates
of annual per capita rice demand in the Philip-
pines, which range from 111 kg (FNRI 2003)
to 118 kg (Malabanan 2007).
An alternative interpretation is that our es-
timates represent demand when facing a one-
timeopportunitytobuygoldenrice.Giventhat
rice has a shelf-life of at least a year, under
this interpretation our results could better be
thoughtofasestimatesofannualdemandcon-
strained by the quantity that participants can
easilystore.Todeterminewhetherparticipants
are buying for a week or a year, the researcher
could repeat the experiment a week later us-
ing the same participants to see whether their
demand decreases substantially.10
10 We thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.
This problem is likely to be most pro-
nounced at relatively low prices. For instance,
in this study we sold golden rice for as little as
− − P5per500gbag—one-thirdoftheﬁeldpriceof
conventional rice. At such a low price it is pos-
sible that participants would buy rice not just
for their own family’s consumption but also to
give away to friends and possibly for resale.
Thisproblemisnotinsurmountable,though.
Because experimental valuation studies typ-
ically focus on value-added versions of a
generic ﬁeld substitute (e.g., Rousu and Cor-
rigan 2008), the most relevant prices will be
those higher than the ﬁeld price of the conven-
tional good.
In order to avoid bias introduced by par-
ticipants stocking up on low-price goods, the
researcher may choose to estimate demand
based only on prices greater than or equal to
theﬁeldpriceoftheconventionalsubstitute(s)
(in this experiment− − P15). However, it may still
beadvisabletopresentparticipantswithprices
lower than this ﬁeld price in order to avoid
signaling that the focus good is more valuable
than its substitutes.
Issues of timeframe and storability are eas-
iertodealwithwhenvaluingperishablegoods.
For instance, cooked rice or fresh produce will
have a shelf life of roughly a week. With these
goods the researcher can more conﬁdently in-
terpret OECE results as estimates of weekly
demand. This in mind, the OECE may be best
suited to estimating the value of perishable
goods.
In the analysis that follows, we assume that,
at any given price combination, participants846 August 2009 Amer. J. Agr. Econ.
Table2. AggregateQuantitiesofGoldenRice
and Conventional Rice Demanded
Golden Rice Conventional Rice
Price Quantity Price Quantity
(Philippine Demanded (Philippine Demanded
pesos) (500 g bags) pesos) (500 g bags)
5 727 15 130
7 473 15 143
9 378 15 136
11 301 15 142
13 233 15 146
15 206 15 140
17 118 15 209
19 88 15 226
21 73 15 240
23 64 15 254
25 57 15 252
Table 3. Summary Statistics for Individual
Quantities of Golden Rice Demanded
Std.
Price Mean Median Dev. Minimum Maximum
5 12.0 12 7.9 0 20
7 7.9 9 5.2 0 15
9 6.3 6 4.0 0 11
11 4.9 4.5 3.4 0 9
13 3.8 3.5 2.7 0 7
15 3.5 3 2.8 0 16
17 2.0 2 1.9 0 5
19 1.6 1 1.7 0 5
21 1.3 1 1.5 0 4
23 1.1 0 1.5 0 4
25 0.9 0 1.5 0 4
wish to purchase only the quantity of golden
rice that their household will consume in the
spanofoneweek(i.e.,thereisnostockingupat
low prices, and participants do not buy rice in
order to resell it or to give it to people outside
of their household).
Table 2 reports the aggregated quantity de-
manded from the OECE for each good at
each price combination, while table 3 reports
summary statistics for individual quantities
of golden rice demanded.11 As expected, the
quantity of golden rice demanded falls as the
price increases. We included conventional rice
11 Friedman and Sunder (1994) suggest that participants may be-
haveerraticallyinthelastroundofanexperiment.Therefore,here
and throughout the paper we report results from the fourth of ﬁve
rounds. In all cases results from the ﬁfth round are qualitatively
similar.




All with Cross Prices
Variable Prices Term ≥− − P15
Constant 3.10∗∗ 3.15∗∗ 3.14∗∗
(0.11)a (0.12) (0.27)
pj −0.14∗∗ −0.14∗∗ −0.14∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Dlow × pj — −0.01 —
(0.01)
  0.61∗∗ 0.61∗∗ 0.94∗∗
(0.11) (0.11) (0.20)
Observations 660 660 360
Log likelihood −1,210 −1,209 −527
aStandard errors in parentheses.
Double asterisks (∗∗) denotes signiﬁcance 0.01 level.
in this study primarily as an explicit reminder
ofoutsidesubstitutes.Becauseofitseasyavail-
ability outside of the experimental market, we
make no claims that the numbers reported in
table 2 accurately reﬂect demand for conven-
tional rice given the introduction of golden
rice.
As described in the earlier section, we es-
timate the quantity of golden rice demanded
by each participant as a function of the price
of golden rice using a random effects Pois-
son regression. The second column of table 4
presentstheresultsofthisanalysisforallinfor-
mation treatments combined. Both beta coef-
ﬁcients have the expected sign and are highly
statistically signiﬁcant. Figure 2 shows both
the observed demand (aggregated across the
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Figure 2. Observed versus estimated demand
from all treatmentsCorrigan et al. Open-Ended Choice Experiments and Experimental Auctions 847
associated with the results of the random ef-
fects Poisson regression (scaled up by sixty).12
The estimate of   is also signiﬁcantly differ-
ent from zero, conﬁrming that a model that al-
lows for the variance of qij to exceed the mean
is warranted.
To test whether participants behave differ-
ently when facing prices below the − − P15 ﬁeld
price (e.g., hording rice for the future or pur-
chasing large quantities to share with friends),
we report the results of two additional re-
gressions. The ﬁrst estimates the quantity de-
manded by participant i facing price j as
E(qij) = exp( 0 +  1pj
+ 2(Dlow × pj) + ui)
(6)
where Dlow is a dummy equal to one if the
price of golden rice is less than − − P15. This
speciﬁcation allows for a distinct change in
price responsiveness when golden rice costs
less than conventional rice. The estimate of
 2 presented in the third column of table 4 is
not signiﬁcantly different from zero (p = 0.32)
and therefore provides no evidence that par-
ticipants’ behavior changes markedly at low
prices.Thesecondalternativeregressionlimits
observationstothosewhenthepriceofgolden
rice is greater than or equal to− − P15. The results
reported in the fourth column of table 4 are
extremely similar to those reported in the sec-
ondcolumn,whichagainprovidesnoevidence
that participants’ behavior changes markedly
at low prices.
We estimate own-price elasticity as de-
scribed in equation (4). For example, when pj
equals the − − P15 ﬁeld price of its conventional
substitute, ˆ   =− 2.03usingthedatafromallin-
formation treatments, suggesting that a 1% in-
crease in the price of golden rice would lead to
roughly a 2% decrease in quantity demanded.
A 95% conﬁdence interval about this estimate
is [−2.14, −1.92], which is estimated by multi-
plyingpj by(ˆ  1 ± 1.96ˆ  1),where ˆ  1 isthestan-
dard error from the second column of table 4.
Own-price elasticity estimates associated with
a selection of golden rice prices used in the
experiment are reported in table 5. Note that,
as expected, own-price elasticity increases in
absolute value terms as the price rises. That is,
participantsbecomemorepricesensitiveasthe
12 NotethattherandomeffectsPoissondemandspeciﬁcationim-
plicitly assumes a vertical asymptote of zero. This may not be ap-
propriate for staple goods without ﬁeld substitutes. In these cases,
buyers may be willing to pay exorbitantly high prices in order to
maintain a subsistence level of consumption.
Table 5. Own-Price Elasticity and Consumer
Surplus Estimates at Selected Prices
Price Own-Price Elasticity Consumer Surplus
5 −0.68 84
[−0.71, −0.64]a [69, 102]
11 −1.49 37
[−1.57, −1.41] [30, 46]
15 −2.03 22
[−2.14, −1.92] [17, 27]
19 −2.30 13
[−2.70, −2.43] [10, 16]
25 −3.38 6
[−3.56, −3.20] [4, 7]
a95% conﬁdence interval in parentheses.
price of golden rice rises relative to the price
of the conventional substitute.
Next, we estimate consumer surplus as de-
ﬁned in equation (5). Assuming again that
golden rice sells for − − P15, the average partici-
pant would derive an estimated− − P22 worth of
additional consumer surplus from the intro-
ductionofgoldenricebasedontheresultsfrom
all treatments. We use a parametric bootstrap-
ping technique to generate a 95% conﬁdence
interval around CS of [− − P17,− − P27]. Speciﬁcally,
we drew 10,000 realizations of  0 and  1
from a multivariate normal distribution with
a variance–covariance matrix and mean vec-
tortakenfromtheregressionwhoseresultsare
presented in the second column of table 4. For
each of these draws, we calculated an estimate
of CS.T he reported conﬁdence interval was
generated by ranking these 10,000 estimates
anddeletingthehighestandlowest250.Table5
reports selected consumer surplus estimates
associated with the regression results from the
second column of table 4.
While techniques exist for calculating com-
pensating variation directly (e.g., Hausman
1981), Willig (1976) shows that compensating
variation and consumer surplus should only
differ substantially when income effects are
very large or when the budget share of the
good in question is large. In particular, Willig
shows that the proportion by which compen-








where y is income and   is the income elas-
ticity of demand. In our study, the average
participant’s monthly income from all sources
was − − P4,083. Using this conservative measure848 August 2009 Amer. J. Agr. Econ.
of income, equation (7) suggests that in order
for CV and CS to differ by more than 1% in
the case where pj =− − P15,   would need to be
greater than 3.70. This seems unlikely given
that Seale, Regmi, and Bernstein (2003) ﬁnd
that income elasticities for food products typ-
ically range from 0.10 to 1.16.
Comparison of the Uniform-Price Auction
and the OECE
Inthissection,wecomparetheperformanceof
the OECE to that of a conventional uniform-
priceauction.Webeginbytestingwhetherpos-
itive and negative information about genetic
modiﬁcation has the expected impact on WTP
estimates under both valuation methods. We
then consider whether WTP estimates from
bothmethodsareinﬂuencedbypostedmarket
information in repeated rounds. In all cases,
WTP in the OECE is identiﬁed as the highest
price at which a participant indicated a posi-
tive quantity demanded. Because mean WTP
estimates are inﬂuenced by censoring in the
OECE, the following analysis focuses on me-
dian WTP estimates.
Tegene et al. (2003) ﬁnd that when partic-
ipants are faced with conﬂicting positive and
negative information, they put more weight
on negative information and consequently de-
crease their WTP values. Table 6 presents
mean and median WTP estimates from the
fourth round of the OECE and uniform-
price auction. Median WTP estimates from
the OECE are consistent with the WTP or-
deringsuggestedbytheexistingliterature(i.e.,
WTPPositive > WTPNo info > WTPTwo−sided >
WTPNegative).WTPestimatesfromtheauction,
ontheotherhand,areinconsistentwiththislit-
erature in that both mean and median WTP
estimates from the two-sided-information
Table 6. Mean and Median Bids Under the Uniform-Price Auction and
OECE by Information Type
Information Treatment
No Information Positive Negative Two-Sided
WTP (OECE)
Mean 20 23 16 18
Median 21 25 15 17
Standard deviation 4.62 .97 .85 .4
WTP (ﬁfth price)
Mean 25 33 15 12
Median 25.53 0 1 8 1 2 .5
Std. dev. 9.42 6 .67 .05 .8
treatment are less than those from the
negative-information treatment.
In order to control for socioeconomic dif-
ferences among participants presented with a
given valuation method, table 7 reports the
results of a random effects analysis of WTP
conditioned on demographic characteristics,
information treatment, round effects (repre-
sented as dummy variables), and posted mar-
ket information from the previous round. We
control for censoring at − − P25 in the OECE
treatments by using random effects tobit es-
timation. Consistent with the results of the
unconditional analysis presented in table 6,
our regression results show that in the auc-
tion treatments positive information has no
statisticallysigniﬁcanteffectonWTPandtwo-
sided information has a larger negative effect
on WTP than negative information. These re-
sults conﬂict with the ﬁndings of the extant lit-
erature. Information effects from the OECE,
on the other hand, have the expected signs
andrelativemagnitudes.Whiletherearemany
possible interpretations of these results, our
conjecture is that because the market envi-
ronment in choice experiments is more fa-
miliar to participants, these studies might be
expectedtoproducemorereliableresultsthan
less familiar auctions. It is possible that if our
auction sample had been larger (e.g., Tegene
etal.2003)orhadauctionparticipantsreceived
more rounds of training (e.g., Fox, Hayes, and
Shogren 2002), the information effects would
havebeenmoreconsistentwiththeextantauc-
tion literature.
Several studies have found that, when win-
ning bids are posted after each auction round,
auction bids tend to increase across rounds.
While some researchers argue that this may
be the result of market information from early
rounds biasing participants’ bidding behaviorCorrigan et al. Open-Ended Choice Experiments and Experimental Auctions 849
Table 7. Regression Results on WTP (with Afﬁliation Effect)
Uniform-Price Auction OECE
Variables Coefﬁcient t-value Coefﬁcient z-value
Intercept (no information) −2.74 −0.12 34.67 15.35∗∗∗
Positive information 0.46 0.11 1.81 2.84∗∗∗
Negative information −7.21 −2.16∗∗ −6.11 −9.93∗∗∗
Two-sided information −10.37 −2.80∗∗∗ −5.28 −9.28∗∗∗
Round 3 1.44 1.34 0.13 0.26
Round 4 4.90 4.15∗∗∗ 0.48 0.88
Round 5 4.58 3.08∗∗∗ 0.46 0.94
Market informationa 0.24 3.86∗∗∗ −0.08 −1.05
Gender −8.73 −3.41∗∗∗ −0.54 −1.11
Age 1.29 1.07∗ −0.35 −3.53∗∗∗
Classiﬁcation of year in college −3.92 −0.69 −7.46 −7.87∗∗∗
Household size 0.16 0.33 −0.11 −1.33
Family income −0.18 −0.75 −0.22 −6.35∗∗∗
Frequency of buying rice −5.30 −2.16∗∗ −2.34 −5.43∗∗∗
Level of awareness about golden rice 2.05 0.79 0.97 1.90∗
Bidder opinion on safety of golden rice −0.53 −0.21 −0.04 −0.07
Log likelihood: −1,408.80 Log likelihood: −575.39
aPrior ﬁfth-highest price or the average quantity demanded depending on treatment.
Single asterisk (∗), double asterisks (∗∗), and triple asterisks (∗∗∗) denote signiﬁcance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
in later rounds (e.g., Corrigan and Rousu
2006), others argue this increase in bids is be-
nign as it indicates that participants are learn-
ing that bidding truthfully is indeed in their
best interest (e.g., List and Shogren 1999). It
may be the case that both arguments are cor-
rect. For instance, participants may initially
(and erroneously) believe that they can earn
a larger consumer surplus by underbidding.
Over successive rounds they learn that under-
bidding is not in their self interest, and this
learning is accelerated when posted prices are
high.
Table 8 presents summary statistics for
ﬁve rounds (across all information treat-
ments) from the uniform-price auction and
Table 8. WTP Summary Statistics from All





Mean 19 19 19 20 20
Median 21 21 20 21 21
Std. dev. 6.15 .96 .15 .95 .8
WTP (uniform-price auction)
Mean 10 14 17 21 23
Median 10 11.51 5 1 82 0
Std. dev. 6.91 0 .21 2 .81 6 .91 7 .4
the OECE. Both mean and median WTP
increase across rounds in the auction; how-
ever, median WTP remains essentially con-
stant across rounds in the OECE. After each
auctionround,themonitorpostedtheIDnum-
bers and bids of the four highest bidders along
with the ﬁfth-highest bid. After each OECE
round, the monitor posted the desired quanti-
ties of golden rice and regular rice at the bind-
ing price combination for all the participants.
Focusing again on the regression results pre-
sented in table 7, round effects were highly
signiﬁcant in the auction, as were the effects
of posted prices. This suggests both a general
tendency for bids to increase across rounds,
and that bids in later rounds are inﬂuenced by
prices posted after earlier rounds. There is no
evidence of either round effects or bias from
posted market information in the OECE.
There are several possible explanations for
why posted market information would not
affect participants’ behavior in the OECE.
(a) Because there is no “winning” associated
with choice experiments, the top-dog effect
(Shogren and Hayes 1997) can be ruled out. If
thetendencyforauctionbidstoincreaseacross
rounds is driven primarily by participants’ de-
sire to be among the top bidders (as opposed
totheutilityparticipantsexpecttoderivefrom
theproductitself),thiswouldsuggestthatCEs
provide more reliable value estimates. (b) Be-
cause participants are more familiar with the850 August 2009 Amer. J. Agr. Econ.
market environment in choice experiments,
theymayimmediatelyrecognizethatrespond-
ing truthfully is in their best interest (unlike
experimentalauctionswhereseveralroundsof
trainingmayberequiredtolearnthatthemar-
ket is demand revealing). This is supported by
theapparentconvergencebetweenOECEand
auction median WTP estimates by round ﬁve.
Note that in the auction, median WTP esti-
mates double over the course of ﬁve rounds,
bringing them in line with the nearly constant
medianWTPestimatesfromtheOECE.13This
explanation would also suggest that CEs of
all types may provide more reliable value es-
timates. This result is particularly relevant in
applications where researchers are unable to
conductrepeatedrounds(e.g.,duetotimecon-
straints in the ﬁeld). (c) Because participants
were presented with more information in the
OECE treatments, they may not have been
abletoprocessitallinthelimitedtimebetween
rounds. With the data from this study, we are
not able to say deﬁnitively which of these ex-
planationsisthemostlikely,althoughthisisan
interesting avenue for future research.
Conclusions
In this study, we introduce an open-ended
choice experiment that asks consumers to
make decisions parallel to those that they rou-
tinely make in the ﬁeld and which allows re-
searchers to estimate WTP and demand for
new products or product traits while con-
trolling for the existence of ﬁeld substitutes.
The OECE’s greatest strength relative to ex-
perimental auctions or conventional choice
experiments is that it allows researchers to es-
timateaparticipant’sentiredemandcurveand
thereby meaningfully aggregate across partic-
ipants to estimate market demand. However,
the OECE as presented here is limited to es-
timating demand for one novel good, whereas
other CE designs can be used to estimate the
value of multiple new goods (e.g., Alfnes et al.
2006). And because we choose not to vary the
price of the ﬁeld substitute sold, we cannot
estimate cross-price elasticity (e.g., Lusk and
Schroeder 2004).
In this article, we also compare bidding be-
havior and information effects in repeated
rounds of uniform-price auctions and OECEs.
13 Using a nonparametric Fisher’s exact test, we reject the null
hypothesis that round 1 bids for the two valuation methods are
drawn from a sample with the same median (p < 0.01). We cannot
reject that null hypothesis for round 5 bids (p = 0.42).
Speciﬁcally, we analyze bidding behavior in
termsofpostedmarketinformationandround
effects. We also examine the effects of positive
and negative information on WTP. Our ﬁnd-
ings generally suggest that: (a) there is no ev-
idence of afﬁliation or round effects with the
OECE,and(b)theOECEproducedestimates
of information effects on WTP that are more
consistent with existing auction studies (e.g.,
Tegeneetal.2003;Lusketal.2004;Rousuetal.
2005; Huffman et al. 2007).
Regarding the absence of afﬁliation or
round effects, this may suggest that less effort
is required to familiarize participants with the
OECE than with the uniform-price auction.
For example, table 8 shows that, while both
mean and median WTP estimates doubled
across the ﬁve auction rounds, mean and me-
dian WTP estimates are virtually unchanged
across the ﬁve OECE rounds and are always
roughly equal to estimates from the ﬁnal auc-
tion round. However, these results could also
be partly attributed to the OECE’s informa-
tion revelation properties. OECE participants
were presented with a great deal of informa-
tion after each round. The difﬁculty of pro-
cessing all of this information may have led
them to base their actions solely on their own
value estimates without incorporating the val-
uations of other participants. Further, because
there is no “winning” bid in the OECE, partic-
ipants could not adjust their valuation toward
the posted information (i.e., the winning bids).
More research would be required to answer
this question.
Regarding the consistency of information
effects, our results suggest that WTP esti-
mates from the OECE may be more reliable
than those from the uniform-price auction.
However, it is also possible that our auction
results are anomalous due in part to our rel-
atively small sample size and/or our relatively
small number of rounds. Repeating our auc-
tion treatments with a larger sample and with
more rounds (e.g., ten rounds) of bidding in-
stead of ﬁve may well produce results more in
line with the extant information literature.
Our ﬁndings lend support to the wider use
of the OECE in estimating information ef-
fects on consumers’ acceptance of new prod-
ucts or product traits. Future research might
try to compare the OECE with other valu-
ation methods to test the robustness of the
OECE results in this study. The timeframe
implicit in OECE demand estimates also de-
serves greater attention when dealing with
a nonperishable good like rice. Repeating aCorrigan et al. Open-Ended Choice Experiments and Experimental Auctions 851
study like this one at regular intervals with the
same set of participants would help to deter-
mine whether demand is determined by the
shelf life of the good or (as we have assumed
in this study) the frequency with which par-
ticipants typically buy that good. Finally, the
impact of the choice of price combinations on
demand estimates should be investigated, par-
ticularly in light of increasing awareness of the
role that anchoring plays in the formation of
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Appendix
The proof closely follows Becker, DeGroot, and
Marschak (1964). Start by deﬁning x∗
i (px, py, mi)
as the quantity of good x demanded that maximizes
participant i’s utility u(x, y, mi) given the price of
goodxpx,thepriceofgoodypy,andincomemi.Sim-
ilarly, let y∗
i (px, py, mi) maximize u(x, y, mi) given
px, py, and mi.
By deﬁnition of x∗
i (·) and y∗
i (·), it is in partic-











good x is not available outside of the experimental
auction,goodyisavailableatpricepy,anditiscom-
mon knowledge that the binding price combination
will later be chosen at random from a known distri-
bution.
Now, suppose that in response to price combi-
nation [p
j
x, py], participant i chooses to indicate a
quantity demanded ˜ xi(·)  = x∗
i (·). By deﬁnition of
x∗
i (·), u(˜ xi, y∗,mi) ≤ u(x∗





weakly dominates (truth telling strictly dominates
if we assume that x∗
i (·)i sthe unique quantity that
maximizes u(·)).
Finally, given that x∗
i (·)i s, by deﬁnition, the
Marshallian demand for good x, participant i’s best
response at every price combination [p
j
x, py]i st o
reveal his/her true Marshallian quantity demanded.